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UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE REQUIREMENT
Jeffrey J. Pokorak
I'd like to start with the 1971 case of McGautha v. California [402 U.S. 183, 204
(197 1)], in which Justice Harlan wrote:
To identify, before the fact, those characteristics of criminal homicides and their
perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to express these characteristics in
language which can be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority
appear to be tasks which are beyond present human ability.
I refer to this as "Harlan's problem of systemic imperfection." Now I have personally
changed a lot since 1971, when I was twelve, but I do not think human ability or human
nature really has changed that much since the time of the second Nixon administration.
From that conclusion by the Supreme Court, I think one can go in two basic direc-
tions. First, one could travel the cynical route that Justice Harlan takes, and ultimately
conclude the legal system cannot perfectly regulate such decisionmaking processes in
advance, so there is no reason to try. Or, in the shorter version: if mistakes are made,
and innocent people are executed; well, that is just an acceptable cost of a death pen-
alty system. The opposite path from the one taken by Harlan and the Supreme Court
starts with the same premise that such decisions are, in fact, beyond the ability of peo-
ple-prosecutors, judges and juries--to perfectly effectuate. However, the cautious or
enlightened path from that reality would lead to the conclusion that in light of the in-
ability to guarantee a correct result, our society and laws just should not tolerate any
death penalty system.
I am discussing this fundamental divide by way of introduction. Thank you very
much Professor Hoffmann and my thanks to Indiana University for giving us an oppor-
tunity to think about a third way of meeting Harlan's "problem of imperfection." The
question posed at this symposium is whether one can build into a system that is neces-
sarily imperfect some procedures which will create a scheme that is significantly less
dangerously flawed and therefore leads to more perfect implementation and results?
In the discussion so far, we have focused primarily on lessons learned from post-
conviction exonerations. Most scientific determinations of innocence, however, thank-
fully occur before trial. How does that happen? In the average case, the local police
agency decides that they have sufficient evidence on some suspect, they run after and
catch them, they put them in jail, they take some evidence from them and then send
some evidence to the state crime lab or to the FBI for analysis. In DNA cases in which
there is some evidence from the crime that can be tested, regardless of the police belief
that they have caught the right person, a high percentage of those cases--once over
60/o--are returned by the lab as exonerations. So, even in those cases where, accord-
ing to the police, there is a huge amount of evidence suggesting the guilt of a suspect,
they are more often than not wrong. I do not know what the current FBI exoneration
rate is, but even if it has been halved to one-in-three exonerated by scientific testing,
that still represents an amazingly high error rate for local law enforcement. And these
mistakes are made during the investigative stage of a case before the adversarial system
and the involvement of lawyers and experts for the defense. Additionally, I have never
heard of any reason to believe that police and prosecution mistake rates are any less in
the vast majority of cases that have no DNA evidence to test.
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I have four overall points that I want to discuss which flow from this investigative
error reality. First, Dean Lefstein pointed out that a great service of the Council's Re-
port is that it openly acknowledges by its very creation to everyone throughout the
country that all death penalty schemes currently employed in this country are no longer
legitimate in the sense that none of them represent a credible way of determining who
should live and who should die. That inescapable conclusion has been proven by the
number ofpostconviction exonerations and the number of reversals because of substan-
tive legal errors. There is a growing realization by everyone in the community, both
pro-death penalty and anti-death penalty, that the old systems are too flawed to be sus-
tained. And this view is gaining general public acceptance. Even the people who are
very much in favor of death as punishment, including prosecutors and judges, now face
much more skeptical juries than they did even ten years ago. That juror skepticism
translates into very time consuming and costly prosecutions that end in life verdicts.
That is not a good result for a prosecutor who has a competitive attitude or political
interest about these things.
Then what is the point of this particular legislation? Is it, in fact, to find a hyperag-
gravated class of people who we will seek the death penalty against? Now, that is also,
I believe, a very noble endeavor. In McCleskey v. Kemp [481 U.S. 279 (1987)], Justice
Stevens writing in dissent noted that statistics indicate that in hyperaggravated crime
cases (for example when several people are killed by one defendant) improper discre-
tionary factors seem to drop out of the decisionmaking process. When such improper
factors, like statistically significant race effects related to the race of victims and the
race of defendants, are eliminated, we achieve a much more just result in sentencing.
Therefore, hyperaggravating the predicate crime can go a long way toward a less
flawed system. I am not convinced, however, that this Council's Report as currently
constituted actually applies only to hyperaggravated crimes. I'll give two examples.
First, narrowing the class of death-eligible defendants based on their purported mo-
tive is a poor way to define a hyperaggravated category of criminal behavior. It is very
hard to accurately prove an individual actor's motive and it doesn't really do much to
narrow the class of those eligible for death. You can put whatever the "crime dujour"
is into the motivation slot-it could be 'drug king pin' (§ 1988 in the Omnibus Crime
Act) or today's 'terrorism' (which is the choice of this particular proposal)--without
really addressing an individual's actual death-worthiness. Indeed, from all current evi-
dence from the flawed federal prosecutions, 'terrorism' as a motivation-based aggrava-
tor is likely to increase racial sentencing disparities rather than reduce them. Another
example is the proposed torture aggravator. It will only take one prosecutor and one
court in one case to figure out that almost every murder involves "torture." Rape, for
example, is not an enumerated aggravator in the Council's proposal. How long will it
be before every rape/murder case is treated as a "torture" case? Recall, we have no less
authority than the international tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia to cite
for the proposition that rape is, in fact, a type of torture. This is an example of the phe-
nomenon of aggravator creep, in which statutory categories which are designed and
drafted to be narrow quickly become very broad in practice. I believe the Council tried
to create a very narrow group of prerequisite crimes but failed to consider the very real
expansion likely immediately after adoption of the plan. To be meaningful, a proper
hyperaggravating factor ought to be fact and result based, as in "more than one person
killed," or defendant fact and status based, as in someone who has already killed, re-
ceived a life sentence, and then while in prison kills again. Only by drafting such spe-
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cific hyperaggravators can the Council be assured that the defendants sentenced to
death are truly the "worst of the worst."
My second criticism with the Report's proposal for narrowing is found in its re-
quirement for proof of physical evidence linking crime and defendant. Who leaves
physical evidence at a crime scene? Generally the most careless or the most passion-
ate-by that, I mean people who are not criminal masterminds. Such people, who are
sometimes referred to as 'street criminals,' are not the people who are necessarily the
most deserving of the death penalty. Rather, the people who are the least effective at
planning ahead, taking care during a murder, and cleaning up afterwards are the most
likely to receive death. This is in spite of the fact that these acts are often thought of as
the best indicia of malum in se mens rea or true evilness if you prefer. The Council's
proposals are likely to fall most often on people who commit crimes in a sloppy fash-
ion leaving physical evidence behind.
I have been trying to figure out a way that it could happen, but I do not believe
Timothy McVeigh would be eligible for the death penalty under this proposed statute. I
do not recall any physical evidence that actually linked McVeigh to the crime itself as
that type of evidence was blown up in the bombing. The only physical evidence that
you might argue would be evidence is his signature from buying the fertilizer-but
there was no scientific evidence that is was the same fertilizer that actually blew up at
the scene. The same problem exists with a criminal mastermind or crime producer, like
Osama bin Laden, as there is no physical link between him and his crimes. Crimes that
seemingly require the most evil intelligence and intent could not be tried as capital
offenses under the Council's recommendation.
So, then, what does this proposal that may become a statute do? It does not really
hyperaggravate the prerequisite crime. It does not necessarily identify the most deserv-
ing of death. It design is limited, it seems, to increasing the certainty that those people
who are put on death row are guilty of some crime involving a death. And those people
will be the careless and the passionate who are often the poor, the drug-involved, and
people with mentally illness-not the clever planners or removed masterminds. For
example, there is significant debate about whether there is any physical evidence to tie
Scott Peterson to the crime at all. It may in his case come down to a hair strand that
does not tell time. Those types of defendants would be excluded from capital prosecu-
tion under the Council's plan.
Next, speaking as a death penalty defense lawyer, I anticipate a valid Ring and Ap-
prendi challenge to the scheme. In Apprendi v. New Jersey [530 U.S. 466 (2000)], the
United States Supreme Court held, roughly, that every fact that increases the range of
punishment and available sentence must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
Now this was stated with a number of caveats, particularly for our purposes the Court's
clear statements that the Apprendi holding did not apply to death penalty schemes. But,
just two terms later, the Court had to eat those words because the law is a strange and
wonderful thing that sometimes creates its own inevitability. The constitutional logic of
Apprendi could not be kept away from the Courts death penalty jurisprudence. There-
fore, in Ring v. Arizona [536 U.S. 584 (2002)], the Court recognized that any fact that
is a necessary precursor to the imposition of a sentence of death, rather than life, must
be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
That is why I'm willing to take up this question that Dr. Selavka passed on: Can
anyone explain how the reasonable doubt standard can apply to this Report's language?
The Report indicates that a capital jury "should be required to find that there is conclu-
sive scientific evidence... , reaching a high level of scientific certainty, that connects
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
the defendant to either the location of the crime scene, the murder weapon, or the vic-
tim's body, and that strongly corroborates the defendant's guilt of capital murder." It
seems that the Ring "beyond a reasonable doubt" problem with this proposal is the
inevitable problem anyone encounters trying to find an adjective that exists beyond a
reasonable doubt. The three critical adjectival or qualitative phrases in this jury instruc-
tion are "conclusive scientific evidence," "high level of scientific certainty," and
"strong corroboration." Not only do these phrases invite Ring challenges, they also
necessitate a wonderful lengthy and very expensive trial battle between prosecution
and defense experts regarding how the jury should apply the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard to less stringent scientific proof standards.
Responsible courts could work some of this out by requiring jury instructions that
very narrowly tailor the adjectival phrase applications. However, we should be mindful
that there are jurisdictions where these issues have not yet been resolved even after
decades of application. In Texas, for example, one of the sentencing aggravators is
whether there is a probability of the defendant's future dangerousness, the speculative
existence of which the jury is to determine beyond a reasonable doubt. Go figure. I still
haven't figured that one out. So I perceive an Apprendi/Ring problem in the proposal
lurking in the space between reasonable doubt and the adjectives used to describe this
sort of questionable quantitative evidence.
One great example of this proof space that I refer to is the application of fingerprint
evidence. In the Kerry Max Cook case, a brutal rape-murder in the Dallas area, the
conviction turned largely on one fingerprint. There was a fingerprint that belonged to
Kerry Max Cook on the sliding glass door to the woman's house where the murder
took place and where her body was found. The fingerprint expert-a local police offi-
cer-testified that not only was it Cook's fingerprint, but that the officer could tell
within two hours when that fingerprint was put on the window. Of course, we all know
that's bullshit. And yet the Court allowed the testimony.
Kerry Max Cook's case was reversed twice. He was found guilty and sentenced to
death three times in that case until there was an investigation outside of the judicial
process that proved Cook's innocence and pointed to the murderer. Not surprisingly,
the likely killer had had an affair with the victim that ended in an unhappy break-up.
The murderer, then, was the most likely suspect, not the rather mentally fragile person,
Kerry Max Cook, who happened to be in the neighborhood of the crime at the time it
happened. So the conclusive scientific fingerprint evidence in that case certainly con-
nected the defendant to the location of the crime scene and the victim's body. Under
the Council's recommended punishment proof standard, that would have been suffi-
cient evidence for execution in Massachusetts. Whether such fingerprint evidence addi-
tionally "strongly corroborates" guilt is unclear and would depend on limiting stan-
dards created by a court after conviction and sentence of death. How an appellate court
would handle such an issue, in the face of a jury determination that death was the ap-
propriate sentence for a brutal crime and a brutal killer is an open question. I for one
have seen bad facts make bad law too often to count on the courts to create standards
to save the innocents like Kerry Cook.
My fourth point involves defending capital cases and the costs associated with zeal-
ous representation. The proposal does a greatjob of addressing a number ofprosecuto-
rial, judicial and jury issues such as the burdens of proof discussed above and certain
aspects of case bifurcation. But I believe the proposal improperly ignores law enforce-
ment discretion regarding the resources they will commit to any particular case, and the
resulting decisions of what case will be pursued vigorously and what evidence will be
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gathered or preserved. The failure of police to properly handle evidence can be the
difference between conviction or acquittal. Think O.J. Simpson. Likewise, without law
enforcement evidence standards, there is too much likelihood that murders in one lo-
cale will be handled very differently than murders in the neighboring town. And just
subtle differences in evidence gathering will mean the difference between capital and
non-capital prosecutions.
The Report also doesn't flesh out, and I'm sure any resultant statute would have to,
those procedures which focus on the defendant's individual characteristics which are
required as a prerequisite to the constitutionality of any death penalty scheme. Particu-
larly, the proposal largely ignores the constitutionally required consideration of miti-
gating factors and all evidence related to their application. What standard of proof will
apply to mitigating factors? Mitigating evidence? Who bears the burden of proof on
mitigating circumstances? All these details are amazingly critical to the legality of the
scheme. Additionally, the failure to address the defense side of the constitutional equa-
tion hides the cost of the important and necessary near-unlimited access to expert wit-
nesses that any capital defendant requires.
One could also improve this proposal by requiring the creation of a state-wide capi-
tal defender office or agency. Most capital defendants are indigent and will require
public-financed appointed counsel. This fact is not well considered in the proposal and
the current system of criminal defense in Massachusetts is unequipped to handle such
complicated cases. The Massachusetts public counsel system is currently in chaos. As I
speak here, judges have ordered pretrial defendants released and their cases dismissed
because there are not enough public defenders and too few private lawyers willing to
work for the meager rates that the state offers. One way of ensuring that at least capital
defendants will have good defense counsel is to follow the example of New York,
which created a statewide special defender unit that pools and applies its own resources
and experience in every appropriate capital case. In other words, Massachusetts should
commit to develop and appoint a stable group of the best and most expert capital de-
fenders to every indigent capital defendant absent a conflict. Massachusetts is small
enough that such a statewide defender could be easily created.
Rather than relying on certified local counsel, or others who would be willing to
travel around the state for the fifty dollars an hour that Massachusetts may be willing to
pay, I believe it would be far better to begin any system with dedicated attorneys, in-
vestigators, and mental health professionals who would be able to become aggressively
involved in the case as soon as an arrest was made. Such a system would increase effi-
ciency as the court would not have to waste time while a new attorney comes up to
speed on the special legal framework governing capital cases. Further, such a special-
ized unit would be conversant with the critical forensic sciences upon which death will
be predicated-for example in fingerprint evidence, or DNA analysis, or mitochondrial
DNA technology. The office would be able to pool the resources and experience of the
staff in order to deploy a defense team that would be willing, ready, and able to under-
stand the nature of any new capital case. This would be a most efficient and cost-
effective way to address an indigent defendant's representation needs. It is also the best
way to guarantee that evidence is vigorously tested and that the statutory procedures
designed to prevent innocents from being executed are carefully applied in every case.
I should add that from some prosecutors' standpoint such an independent defender
unit in not necessarily a good thing. For example, in New York, the statewide capital
defenders have been amazingly effective in avoiding sentences of death for their cli-
ents. This result was in many instances the product of the office successfully resolving
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the case before trial. I hope everyone believes that is a desirable result-for defen-
dants, courts, lawyers, and victims-in almost every situation. There will always be
cases that must go to trial, but I think it generally better for the entire system if a con-
clusion can be reached early in the process.
Finally, we ought to remain humble and remember that some of these sciences have
a lot of art involved in them-perhaps more art than science-that they may be on to-
morrow's junk heap of acceptability. Fiber analysis is an example that was mentioned
earlier that would fall into this category. Similarly, bullet lead content analysis, bite
mark analysis, and hair match testimony are all suspect. Just as a cautionary tale, do not
forget that the insanity defense for Charles Guiteau, the man who assassinated Presi-
dent Garfield in 1882, was based on phrenology, the state-of-the-art science of the time
that involved mapping bumps on the head. Even today, evidence of a smudged finger-
print with only three points of comparison instead of a full print, with 20 or more
points, already takes a jury out of the world of science and well into the world of hu-
man error. We should keep in mind our society's ability to develop new, and discard
old, sciences and technologies.
The Council obviously tried to incorporate the scientific evidence restrictions that
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. [509 U.S. 579 (1993)], suggests to
courts. Unfortunately, in Massachusetts, three members of the Supreme Judicial Court
are currently suggesting that Daubert should apply only to novel evidence, which
would have the effect of grandfathering in all the junk science that has been presented
to and accepted by courts up to this time. Thus, even what constitutes science is in dis-
pute in the courts.
The Massachusetts Governor's Council Report is important in its apparent repudia-
tion of the way death is currently meted out in courts across the country. Additionally,
the Counsel has worked hard to make less flawed a human and therefore necessarily
imperfect system. In the final analysis, though, to rest the decision of who should live
and who should die on such disputed standards, procedures, and even disputed science
itself leaves the Massachusetts proposal on the cynical side of Harlan's problem of
systemic imperfection.
FORENSIC SCIENCE OR FORGEIrABLE SCIENCE?
Craig M Cooley
I am an investigator with the Office of the State Appellate Defender's Death Penalty
Trial Assistance Division ("DPTA") in Chicago, Illinois. I have been with the DPTA
for the past three years where I have worked on more than fifteen capital cases. I also
had the opportunity to work on various cases that were affected by Governor Ryan's
commutations and pardons. Prior to law school and my work with the DPTA I received
my graduate degree in forensic science at the University of New Haven.
My main research at the DPTA and during law school has dealt with forensic sci-
ence and miscarriages ofjustice. I have spent countless hours researching those injus-
tices where it appears that forensic fraud or misidentifications played a likely role in an
innocent person's wrongful conviction. After studying these injustices, principally the
capital cases, I came to the unsettling conclusion that we have two broken systems
within the criminal justice system. Not only is the capital punishment system broken, so
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